The Enduring Nexus: A Historical and Contemporary Analysis of Kurdish-Greek Relations

I. Introduction

The relationship between the Kurdish and Greek peoples is a complex tapestry woven over centuries, marked by periods of interaction within larger imperial frameworks, shared experiences of subjugation, divergent national aspirations, and contemporary geopolitical considerations. This report seeks to provide an expert-level analysis of these multifaceted connections, from ancient encounters to the intricate dynamics of the 21st century. The historical depth of the Kurdish presence in Mesopotamia and their interactions with various empires, alongside the long historical trajectory of Greek civilization and its diverse political manifestations, set the stage for their eventual encounters.[1]

The scope of this inquiry encompasses historical interactions within the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, the pivotal impact of early 20th-century political reconfigurations—notably the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne—and the contemporary landscape. The latter includes an examination of the Kurdish diaspora in Greece, the foreign policies of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus towards Kurdish political entities and aspirations (such as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), often referred to as Rojava), and the overarching influence of regional powers, particularly Turkey. The Kurdish people's continuous struggle for autonomy and independence against various regional powers and Greece's own journey from imperial subject to modern nation-state provide parallel, and at times intersecting, narratives of national identity formation and political struggle.[1]

The central thesis of this report posits that Greek-Kurdish relations have been shaped by a confluence of factors: geographical proximity within shared imperial spaces, the rise of distinct nationalisms, the policies of dominant states, and the shifting alliances and rivalries in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. These interactions have ranged from instances of military cooperation and cultural exchange to periods of conflict and mutual suspicion, often influenced by third-party actors and overarching geopolitical currents.

A critical lens through which these relations must be viewed is the evolving nature of both "Greek" and "Kurdish" identities. These identities have not been static; rather, they have often been redefined in response to, and frequently in opposition to, dominant imperial or nationalistic ideologies. Greek identity, for example, transitioned from the ancient city-states through Hellenistic cultural dissemination, Roman and Byzantine imperial constructs, an Orthodox Christian identity under Ottoman rule, and ultimately to a modern national identity.[3] Similarly, Kurdish identity, while rooted in ancient tribal groups, has been "reinvented" in response to various conquests (Arab, Ottoman, Persian) and later forged by modern

nationalism in opposition to the homogenizing nation-building projects of Turkey, Iran, and Arab states.[1] This implies that interactions were not between monolithic, unchanging entities but between groups whose self-perception and political objectives were often in flux, profoundly influenced by the larger powers that controlled the regions they inhabited. Understanding this fluidity is paramount to avoid anachronistically projecting contemporary notions of nationhood onto past interactions.

Furthermore, the well-known Kurdish adage, "No friends but the mountains" [1], reflecting a history of resilience and perceived betrayals by external powers, finds echoes in certain periods of Greek history. During Ottoman rule and in times of external pressure in the modern era, Greeks also experienced isolation and relied on internal fortitude or the often-fickle support of external patrons.[5] While not always translating into direct alliance, this shared historical DNA of navigating treacherous geopolitical landscapes may foster a subtle, underlying empathy. This could, in part, explain the grassroots sympathy observed in Greece towards Kurdish struggles, even when official state policy remains circumspect due to overriding geopolitical considerations.

II. Ancient Roots and Byzantine Encounters

The historical narrative of Kurdish-Greek interactions begins in antiquity, with early documented contacts and a prolonged period of coexistence and conflict along the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire.

Early Mentions and Precursors:

The antecedents of the Kurdish people are traced back to ancient Mesopotamia, with Sumerian cuneiform writings from around 3000 B.C. mentioning the "land of Karda".2 More direct, albeit often hostile, contact with Greek-speaking peoples is recorded in classical texts. Xenophon's Anabasis, chronicling the retreat of ten thousand Greek mercenaries through Persia and Anatolia in 401 B.C., provides a vivid account of their passage through the territory of the Καρδούχοι (Karduchoi).12 These warlike mountain tribes, considered by many scholars to be progenitors of the Kurds, fiercely resisted the Greeks' passage, highlighting an early instance of conflictual interaction.12 The region inhabited by the Karduchoi, known as Gordyene or Corduene, located in present-day southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, became a recurring feature in classical and later Byzantine geographical and historical accounts, often depicted as a rugged, contested borderland between larger empires.12

Kurds within the Byzantine Empire (Eastern Roman Empire):

The Byzantine Empire, the Greek-speaking successor to the Eastern Roman Empire, shared extensive frontiers with regions inhabited by Kurdish groups.18 Following the Arab conquests of the 7th century A.D., the Kurdish area increasingly became a volatile border zone between the expanding Muslim Caliphate and the Christian Byzantine Empire.2 This geographical positioning inevitably led to complex interactions, ranging from military confrontation to pragmatic alliances.

Kurdish troops were reportedly utilized by the Caliphate in securing these frontier areas against the Byzantines.[2] Conversely, the Byzantine Empire also sought to incorporate Kurdish elements into its military and political structures, particularly when it served imperial interests.

A notable example is the Khurramites, a politico-religious movement originating in Persia with presumed Kurdish elements, who rebelled against the Abbasid Caliphate in the 8th and 9th centuries.[12] Following their defeat, a substantial number, estimated by Byzantine sources at around 30,000, fled across the Byzantine border and were welcomed by Emperor Theophilus (reigned 829–842).[12] Michael the Syrian, a later chronicler, explicitly refers to these Khurramites as "Hurdanaye," or Kurds.[12]

Emperor Theophilus integrated these Khurramites into the Byzantine army, deploying them in campaigns against the Arabs.[12] This policy was likely driven by a pragmatic need for experienced soldiers familiar with the eastern frontiers. Some Byzantine sources suggest Theophilus favored these Khurramites, possibly as a counterweight to the powerful and often rebellious Byzantine aristocracy.[12] He reportedly arranged marriages between Khurramite leaders and Byzantine widows from prominent families, an attempt to create a new military and political class loyal to himself. For these actions, hostile Byzantine chroniclers dubbed him "ethnophilos" (gentile-lover).[12] The Khurramite leader, Nasr, adopted Christianity, was baptized as Theophobos ("God-fearing"), and married Emperor Theophilus's own sister.[12] Under Theophobos, these "Persians," as they were sometimes broadly termed in Byzantine texts, played a significant role in the Byzantine army's more offensive posture against the Arabs during the 9th century.[12]

However, this relationship was fraught with the inherent tensions of imperial power dynamics. The influence of Theophobos and his Khurramite forces grew to such an extent that at one point, his troops reportedly attempted to proclaim him emperor against his will.[12] This perceived threat to imperial authority led Theophilus to act decisively. Theophobos was eventually imprisoned and, shortly before Theophilus's own death in 842, executed to ensure a smooth succession for his son, Michael III. The Khurramite ("Persian") military units were subsequently broken up and dispersed.[12] This episode illustrates a recurring pattern in imperial history: the utilization of borderland peoples as military auxiliaries can provide short-term strategic advantages, but their independent power and potential disloyalty remain constant concerns for the central authority. The Byzantine state, like other empires, sought to harness the martial capabilities of groups like the Kurds while simultaneously ensuring they did not challenge imperial control. When these groups became too powerful or were perceived as a threat, the empire would not hesitate to suppress them. This conditional nature of alliances likely contributed to a historical Kurdish experience of caution and, at times, distrust towards larger state powers.

The territory of Gordyene itself was considered Byzantine until the Arab conquests of the 7th century [12], ensuring sustained contact. However, interactions were not solely characterized by military alliances. The weakening of Byzantine and Sassanid Persian power due to the rise of Islam allowed various Kurdish principalities to emerge or assert greater autonomy.[20] This suggests periods where Byzantine control over its eastern peripheries waned, creating political space for local Kurdish entities. Furthermore, some Greek-language sources from a later period recount that Kurds submitted to Islam around 640 A.D. partly in the hope of escaping what they perceived as oppression and destruction at the hands of both the

Byzantines and the Persians.[21] This narrative offers a crucial counterpoint to instances of cooperation, indicating that periods of direct conflict and Byzantine attempts to assert dominance were also part of the historical experience. Such experiences may have driven Kurdish groups towards new religious and political alignments. The adoption of Islam by a majority of Kurds would, over time, create a significant religious divergence from the Christian Byzantine Empire, further complicating relations and often framing future conflicts along religious as well as ethno-political lines.

The ethnic and political landscape of the Byzantine-Kurdish frontier was notably fluid. The Byzantine practice of labeling diverse eastern groups, including the Khurramites, as "Persians" [12]—despite other sources like Michael the Syrian identifying them as Kurds [12]—underscores the often imprecise and politically expedient nature of ethnic categorization in pre-modern empires. The Khurramites themselves were a politico-religious movement, and their ethnic makeup might have been heterogeneous, even if a significant Kurdish component was present. The fact that some Khurramites, like Theophobos, converted to Christianity and married into Byzantine families suggests a degree of assimilation was possible, or at least encouraged by the imperial court for political ends.[12] "Kurdishness" from a Byzantine perspective during this era might have been less about a fixed, monolithic ethnic identity and more about a geographically and culturally distinct group that could be ally or foe, depending on shifting circumstances and imperial needs.

III. Coexistence and Conflict under Ottoman Rule

The rise of the Ottoman Empire in the late medieval period brought both Greeks and Kurds under a single imperial dominion for several centuries. Their experiences within this multi-ethnic, multi-religious empire were distinct, shaped by differing administrative systems, religious affiliations, and geopolitical roles, leading to a complex web of interactions that included periods of cooperation, autonomy, and intense conflict.

Integration into the Ottoman System:

The Ottoman Empire, at its zenith, encompassed vast Kurdish-inhabited territories, often referred to collectively as Ottoman Kurdistan, spanning parts of modern-day Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.22 The initial significant Ottoman-Kurdish contact occurred during the Ottoman conflict with the Safavid Empire of Persia in the early 16th century. In a pivotal moment, Kurdish tribes, under the leadership of the scholar and statesman Idris Bitlisi, allied with the Ottoman Sultan Selim I against the Shi'a Safavids at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514.22 This alliance was instrumental in the Ottoman Empire's acquisition of Eastern Anatolia and parts of Mesopotamia.

As a reward for their loyalty and strategic importance, Sultan Selim I granted many Kurdish tribes a considerable degree of autonomy. This semi-autonomous status, often involving hereditary leadership of Kurdish emirates (principalities), tax exemptions, and the preservation of their tribal structures, persisted in many areas from 1514 until the mid-19th century.[22] Kurdistan was strategically valued by the Ottomans as a crucial buffer zone against the rival Safavid Iran.[23] Numerous Kurdish emirates, such as Baban, Soran, Botan, and Bahdinan, maintained their autonomous existence and governance for centuries within the

broader Ottoman framework, often with their emirs recognized by the Sultan.[20] The Ottomans generally tolerated these emirates as long as they fulfilled their obligations (such as providing troops) and did not pose a direct separatist threat.[23] Until the 19th century, the Ottoman state often interacted with the Kurdish populace indirectly, through these local Kurdish elites and emirs.[24]

Ethnic Greeks, on the other hand, were integrated into the Ottoman system primarily through the *Rum Millet* (Roman Nation). As Orthodox Christians, they were considered *dhimmi* (protected non-Muslims), granted limited freedoms, including the right to worship and maintain communal institutions, but subject to certain legal and social restrictions compared to Muslims.[5] The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was recognized by the Sultan as the religious and, to a degree, political leader (*millet-bashi* or ethnarch) of all Orthodox Christian subjects of the Empire.[5] Within this system, Greeks, particularly the wealthy and influential Phanariot families of Constantinople, carved out significant niches. Phanariots often served in high-ranking positions in the Ottoman administration, notably as dragomen (interpreters and effectively foreign ministers for the Porte) and as hospodars (princes) of the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia).[11] This deep involvement in the central administrative and diplomatic apparatus of the empire distinguished the experience of elite Greeks from the more tribally organized and geographically peripheral Kurdish emirates.

Deterioration of Relations and Rise of Nationalism (19th Century):

The 19th century witnessed a significant shift in Ottoman policies and, consequently, in the relations between the central state and its diverse subject peoples. The Ottoman Empire, facing territorial losses and internal challenges, embarked on a series of centralization and modernization reforms known as the Tanzimat. These reforms aimed to strengthen direct state control over all provinces, which inevitably clashed with the long-standing autonomy of entities like the Kurdish emirates.22 The gradual abolition of these emirates by the mid-1800s and their replacement with centrally appointed governors led to widespread discontent and a series of Kurdish rebellions throughout the century, as Kurdish leaders resisted the erosion of their traditional powers.24 The removal of the emirs also created a power vacuum, leading to increased inter-tribal conflict and the rising influence of religious leaders (sheikhs) as alternative sources of authority and mediation.24

Simultaneously, the 19th century saw growing pressure from European powers on the Ottoman Empire to grant equal rights to its Christian populations.[5] This pressure, often driven by a mix of humanitarian concerns and geopolitical interests, contributed to Ottoman reform edicts such as the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), which promised equality for all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion. However, the implementation of these reforms was often inconsistent and their overall effectiveness in fundamentally altering the status of non-Muslims or satisfying nationalist aspirations was limited.[5] For Greeks, this period saw the rise of nationalist sentiment, culminating in the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) and the establishment of an independent Greek kingdom, which in turn inspired other Balkan nations and influenced Greek communities still within the Ottoman Empire.

Interactions and Conflicts Involving Greeks and Kurds:

The complex multi-ethnic environment of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in its eastern provinces where Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish populations often cohabited or lived in proximity, led to varied interactions.

A notable instance of potential inter-communal alliance against Ottoman policies occurred during Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri's uprising in 1880. Initially accused by the Ottoman Porte of intending to attack Armenian and other Christian populations—a common imperial tactic to sow division—Ubeydullah, an astute diplomat, reportedly sought to unite with Nestorians (Assyrians) and Armenians in a common struggle against Ottoman and Persian encroachment.[20] While this specific alliance did not achieve its long-term goals, largely due to internal Kurdish tribal divisions and the superior military power of the states, it highlights that relations were not monolithically antagonistic and that shared grievances could, at times, foster cooperation.

However, the late 19th century also saw the Ottoman state actively manipulate inter-ethnic relations to assert control. In 1891, Sultan Abdul Hamid II authorized the formation of the *Hamidiye Alayları* (Hamidian Regiments), irregular cavalry units predominantly composed of Sunni Kurdish tribesmen.[9] These regiments were ostensibly created to defend the empire's eastern frontiers against Russian encroachment and to control Armenian nationalist activities. However, they were also used to assert state authority over other Kurdish tribes, and they became notorious for their involvement in the suppression and massacres of Armenian populations in the 1890s.[15] The Hamidiye system empowered certain Kurdish tribal leaders, granting them official status and modern weaponry, but it also exacerbated tensions between these tribes and their settled Armenian and Assyrian neighbors, particularly over issues of land, grazing rights, and taxation.[15] The Ottoman strategy of "divide and rule" is evident here, as the state selectively armed and patronized certain groups to control others, thereby preventing unified opposition.

The tragic events involving the Pontic Greeks in the early 20th century also occurred within this context of Ottoman decline, rising Turkish nationalism, and inter-communal tensions. The Pontic Greek genocide (1914-1923) refers to the systematic persecution, deportation, and massacre of the indigenous Greek Orthodox community of the Pontus region on the Black Sea coast by the Young Turk regime and subsequently by the Kemalist government.[26] Ottoman authorities, under the cover of World War I, and sometimes with the participation of Kurdish paramilitary groups or irregulars, carried out atrocities against Armenian, Assyrian, and Pontic Greek populations.[29] The Turkish historical narrative often frames the "Pontus Problem" (*Pontus Sorunu*) as a separatist Greek nationalist movement, supported by external powers (like Russia and Greece), which involved armed Greek gangs (*çeteler*) attacking Turkish villages and threatening state security, necessitating Ottoman countermeasures.[30] Turkish official sources state that the Turkish Central Army, under commanders like Sakallı Nurettin Pasha, was responsible for the deaths of thousands of Greeks during operations to suppress the "Pontus Rebellion" and the Koçgiri Rebellion (which had Kurdish involvement).[27]

While some Kurdish elements did participate in the violence against Pontic Greeks and Armenians, often as part of the Hamidiye regiments or other irregular forces mobilized by the Ottoman state [15], the picture is not uniform. As with the Armenians, there were instances

where some Kurdish groups or individuals offered protection or remained neutral. The Alevi Kurds of Dersim, for example, are noted for having protected Armenians during the genocide.[31] However, detailed accounts of specific interactions between Pontic Greeks and various Kurdish tribes in the Pontus region—differentiating between those acting as perpetrators under Ottoman command, those acting independently, and those offering protection—are less explicitly detailed in the available sources compared to the more extensively documented Armenian-Kurdish interactions in other parts of Eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman state's capacity to mobilize certain Kurdish tribes against Christian populations, while other Kurds may have resisted or been victims themselves, underscores the complexity of assigning collective responsibility and highlights the internal divisions within Kurdish society.

The differing levels of integration and influence of Greek and Kurdish communities within the Ottoman imperial structure likely led to distinct strategies for survival and advancement. The Phanariot Greeks, operating within the administrative heart of the empire [11], pursued influence through official channels. In contrast, Kurdish emirs in their often remote and mountainous territories relied on tribal loyalties and negotiated autonomy.[22] These divergent paths meant that large-scale political cooperation or conflict between Greek administrative elites and Kurdish tribal leaders was perhaps less common than localized interactions in regions of mixed settlement. The Greek War of Independence, drawing leadership from figures connected to these administrative or commercial elites, presented different challenges and elicited varied responses from Kurdish groups compared to, for instance, Armenian nationalist movements in Eastern Anatolia that more directly clashed with Kurdish tribal interests over land and local dominance.

IV. The Crucible of the Early 20th Century: Treaties, Nationalism, and Divergent Fates

The early 20th century was a period of profound upheaval in the Near East, marked by the final decline and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the crucible of World War I, and the aggressive rise of competing nationalisms. For both Greeks and Kurds, this era brought both fleeting hopes for self-determination and the harsh realities of geopolitical reconfigurations that would decisively shape their modern destinies. The treaties signed in the war's aftermath, particularly Sèvres and Lausanne, stand as critical junctures, illuminating the divergent paths these two peoples would tread.

Impact of Balkan Wars and World War I:

The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) significantly eroded Ottoman power in Europe and further fueled nationalist aspirations among the Empire's remaining subject peoples, including Greeks and Kurds. These conflicts also led to large-scale population displacements and intensified inter-ethnic animosities. The Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I on the side of the Central Powers set the stage for its ultimate demise. During the war, nationalist movements gained considerable traction among Turks, Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Armenians, and Azeris, all envisioning national homelands free from Ottoman subjugation.1 Amidst this turmoil, the Allied

Powers (Britain and France) secretly negotiated the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, which outlined their plans for the post-war division of Ottoman territories into new nation-states and spheres of colonial influence, largely disregarding the complex ethnic realities and aspirations of the local populations.1

The Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920): A Glimmer of Hope

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the victorious Allied Powers imposed the Treaty of Sèvres, which aimed to formally partition the empire's vast territories.1 For the Kurdish people, Sèvres offered an unprecedented, albeit conditional, prospect of statehood. Articles 62, 63, and 64 of the treaty provided for the establishment of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas east of the Euphrates River and south of the proposed Armenian state, with a provision for these Kurds to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations for full independence within one year.20 The treaty also allowed for Kurds residing in the Mosul vilayet (then under British administration) to voluntarily join this independent Kurdish state.20 These articles generated immense hope and expectation among Kurdish nationalists, who had sent a delegation led by Sharif Pasha to participate in preliminary discussions.20

For the Greeks, the Treaty of Sèvres initially appeared to realize significant aspects of the "Megali Idea" (Great Idea), their long-held aspiration of uniting historically Greek-inhabited lands. The treaty granted Greece the administration of Smyrna (modern İzmir) and its surrounding region in Western Anatolia, and significantly limited Turkey to central and northern Anatolia, while also creating an enlarged Armenia in the east.[20]

The Rise of Turkish Nationalism and the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922):

The punitive terms of the Treaty of Sèvres were vehemently rejected by Turkish nationalists, who rallied under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk). They organized a powerful resistance movement aimed at preserving Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia and Thrace.20 A core tenet of Kemal's movement was the preservation of an indivisible Turkish national unity, which often involved the denial or redefinition of non-Turkish identities; Kurds, for instance, were frequently referred to as "Mountain Turks" to fit within this new, homogenous Turkish national narrative.20

The ensuing Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922), part of the larger Turkish War of Independence, was a brutal conflict. It concluded with a decisive Turkish military victory in August 1922, leading to the expulsion of the Greek army from Anatolia and the catastrophic displacement of the Greek Orthodox population from Asia Minor, an event known in Greek history as the Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή (Asia Minor Catastrophe).[20]

The Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923): Divergent Fates Sealed

The military and political victories of the Turkish nationalists rendered the Treaty of Sèvres unenforceable. A new treaty was negotiated and signed at Lausanne, Switzerland, which formally recognized the Republic of Turkey and established its modern borders.1

For the Kurds, the Treaty of Lausanne was a profound disappointment and a historic setback. It made no mention of Kurdish autonomy, an independent Kurdistan, or even specific rights for Kurds as a distinct group.[1] Instead, the formerly Ottoman-administered Kurdish territories were divided among the newly established states of Turkey, Iraq (under British mandate), and Syria (under French mandate), with a significant Kurdish population also remaining in Iran.

Within Turkey, Kurds were not recognized as a national minority with specific linguistic or cultural rights under the Lausanne framework; the treaty's minority protections (Articles 37-45) were primarily interpreted by Turkey as applying to non-Muslim minorities (Greeks, Armenians, and Jews).[32] Consequently, the Treaty of Lausanne is widely viewed by Kurds as the moment that formalized their statelessness and division, laying the groundwork for decades of assimilationist policies and armed struggle, particularly in Turkey.[34] Turkish legal interpretations from the period, as cited by scholars like İsmail Beşikçi, confirm that the existence of Kurds as a distinct entity was not acknowledged in the treaty.[35] The subsequent Şark Islahat Planı (Eastern Reform Plan) of 1925 in Turkey further solidified policies aimed at suppressing Kurdish identity and language.[36]

For the Greeks, the Treaty of Lausanne, while ending the war, codified immense losses. It formalized the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey, which led to the uprooting of approximately 1.5 million Orthodox Christians from Turkey (including Pontic Greeks and other Anatolian Greeks) and around 500,000 Muslims from Greece.[20] This exchange irrevocably altered the demographic landscape of both countries and signified the end of nearly three millennia of Hellenic presence in Asia Minor. While Lausanne brought peace and defined the borders of the modern Greek state, it also marked the definitive end of the Megali Idea. From a Turkish perspective, Lausanne was celebrated as a triumph that secured the Turkish homeland and national independence. However, even among some Turkish nationalists, there was a degree of disappointment that the treaty did not secure certain Aegean islands or a larger portion of Thrace for Turkey, despite the presence of Turkish populations there.[34]

The following table provides a comparative overview of the provisions of the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne concerning Kurds and Greeks:

Table 1: Comparison of Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and Treaty of Lausanne (1923) Provisions for Kurds and Greeks

Feature	Treaty of Sèvres (1920) Provisions	Treaty of Lausanne (1923) Provisions	Impact on Kurds	Impact on Greeks
Kurdish Autonomy/Statehood	Articles 62-64: Provided for local autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas and a path to independence via League of Nations appeal. Mosul Kurds could opt-in. [20]	No mention of Kurdish autonomy or statehood. Kurdish-inhabited lands divided among Turkey, Iraq, Syria. [1]	Devastating. Hopes for independence dashed; formalized statelessness and division. Led to decades of suppression and conflict. [1]	Not directly applicable, as Greek statehood was established.
Greek Territorial Administration in	Greece granted administration of	Smyrna and Eastern Thrace	Indirectly, as Turkish victory	Loss of significant territories

Anatolia	Smyrna and its environs. Eastern Thrace to Greece. [20]	(except a small part around Edirne) returned to Turkey. [20]	influenced overall Lausanne terms.	envisioned under Sèvres. End of "Megali Idea" in Anatolia. [20]
Minority Rights	General provisions for minorities. Specific framework for Kurdish autonomy.	Articles 37-45: Protection for non-Muslim minorities in Turkey (language, religion, education, legal equality). [36]	Kurds, being predominantly Muslim, were not recognized as a distinct minority with specific rights in Turkey, leading to assimilationist policies. [35]	Provided a framework for the rights of the remaining Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul, and for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace (Greece). [36]
Population Exchange	Not a central feature for Greeks/Turks in the same way as Lausanne, though Sèvres dealt with Armenian and Assyrian issues.	Compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox religion in Turkey and Greek nationals of Muslim religion in Greece (with exceptions for Istanbul Greeks and Western Thrace Muslims). [20]	Not directly subjected to the exchange, but the overall redrawing of borders and nation-state formations solidified their division.	Traumatic uprooting of over a million Greeks from Anatolia, ending millennia of presence. Creation of a massive refugee crisis in Greece. [20]

Data Sources for Table: [1]

Shared or Contrasting Grievances regarding Lausanne:

The early 20th-century treaties, particularly Lausanne, created profoundly different sets of grievances for Kurds and Greeks, though both groups experienced significant loss and disappointment. The primary Kurdish grievance stemming from Lausanne is the outright denial of self-determination and statehood that had seemed within reach under Sèvres. This was compounded by the subsequent division of their ancestral lands and the systematic suppression of Kurdish identity, language, and culture within the new nation-states, especially in Turkey.32 Lausanne, for many Kurds, represents an enduring historical injustice, the "confiscation of all rights of the Kurds as a nation" 34, and the root of their ongoing struggle for recognition and rights.

For Greeks, while Lausanne brought an end to a devastating war, it also signified a national catastrophe—the loss of ancient homelands in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, the tragic end of the Megali Idea, and the immense human suffering of the population exchange.[20] The focus

of Greek grievance was on the loss of established communities, territories, and cultural heritage, rather than the denial of a new state as was the case for the Kurds.

Thus, the Treaty of Lausanne marks a critical divergence in the national trajectories of Greeks and Kurds. For Greeks, it led to the painful consolidation of their nation-state, albeit territorially smaller than the grander visions of the Megali Idea, and the absorption of a massive refugee population. For Kurds, it formalized their statelessness and division across multiple, often hostile, nation-states, initiating a new phase of struggle for basic rights and recognition. This fundamental difference in outcome—a consolidated, albeit traumatized, nation-state for Greeks versus institutionalized statelessness for Kurds—has profoundly shaped their respective political priorities and historical memories emanating from this turbulent period.

The geopolitical calculations of the Great Powers (Britain, France, and Italy) were paramount in determining these outcomes. Their initial support for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of states or autonomous zones for minorities, as reflected in Sèvres, gave way to a more pragmatic approach.[20] The success of Kemal Atatürk's nationalist movement, coupled with divisions among the Allies and a strategic reassessment—particularly the desire for a stable Turkey as a bulwark against the nascent Soviet Union and to secure economic interests like the oil fields of Mosul—led to the abandonment of earlier commitments to Kurdish autonomy.[20] As noted by the Swedish legal advisor Ove Bring, Western powers prioritized a strong Turkey, leading to opposition to an autonomous Kurdish state.[35] This illustrates how the fates of smaller nations were often subordinated to the realpolitik of larger imperial powers, a recurring theme in the region's history. Kurdish hopes, as one source poignantly states, were "futile from the moment that the Entente was only interested in securing its economic claims".[20]

Furthermore, the definition of "minority" within the Treaty of Lausanne, primarily centered on non-Muslim communities, created a legal and political framework that allowed the new Turkish Republic to deny specific minority rights to the Kurds, who are predominantly Muslim. This interpretation had long-lasting and severe implications for Kurdish cultural and political expression in Turkey. The Ottoman *Millet* system had categorized populations primarily by religion.[5] Lausanne's minority protection clauses (Articles 37-45) largely continued this emphasis, ensuring certain rights for the remaining non-Muslim communities (Greeks, Armenians, Jews) in Turkey.[36] Since Kurds are overwhelmingly Muslim, they did not fit this definition of a protected minority, despite possessing a distinct language, culture, and historical consciousness. This allowed the Turkish state to argue that Kurds were not a "minority" in the Lausanne sense but were simply "Turks" (or, pejoratively, "Mountain Turks"), thereby justifying policies of linguistic and cultural assimilation.[20] This legalistic interpretation became a cornerstone of Turkish state policy towards its Kurdish population for much of the 20th century and beyond.

V. Contemporary Greek-Kurdish Relations: Diaspora, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics

The relationship between Greeks and Kurds in the contemporary era is multifaceted, shaped by the presence of a significant Kurdish diaspora in Greece, the foreign policy considerations of Greece and Cyprus, and the complex geopolitical dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. These interactions are often viewed through the prism of historical experiences and the enduring influence of regional powers, particularly Turkey.

A. The Kurdish Diaspora in Greece

A notable Kurdish diaspora has formed in Greece, primarily since the 1990s. This migration has been largely driven by war, political persecution, and instability in Kurdish-inhabited regions of Iraq (following the Gulf War and the Anfal campaign) and Turkey (due to the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, and associated state repression).[37] Smaller numbers have also arrived from Syria and Iran.[39] Statistics from the late 1990s indicate that over 43,000 Kurds entered Greece, although a smaller proportion, around 9,797, formally applied for asylum.[37] Current estimates of the Kurdish population in Greece vary, with one 2016 estimate from the Kurdish Institute of Paris suggesting around 40,000 individuals.[37] These communities are concentrated mainly in urban centers such as Athens, Thessaloniki, Patras, and the town of Laurium, which hosts a long-standing refugee reception center.[37] For many Kurdish asylum seekers, Greece is often perceived as a transit country towards other European nations with more robust economies and larger established Kurdish communities, such as Germany.[38]

The Kurdish diaspora in Greece is politically and culturally active. Various Kurdish cultural centers and organizations have been established across the country.[37] These institutions play a vital role in preserving Kurdish language, traditions, and cultural heritage, while also serving as focal points for community organization and political mobilization. Kurds in Greece frequently organize and participate in pro-Kurdish demonstrations and protests, advocating for Kurdish rights and raising awareness about the political situations in their regions of origin.[37] Notable examples include public marches in support of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and protests condemning Turkish military operations in Kurdish areas, such as the 2018 offensive in Afrin, Syria.[37] There have also been reports of a small number of Greek anarchists traveling to Rojava (Northern Syria) to fight alongside Kurdish forces against extremist groups like ISIS, indicating a more direct form of solidarity from certain segments of Greek society.[40]

Social relations between the Greek populace and the Kurdish diaspora are generally characterized as positive.[37] Researcher Aspasia Papadopoulou has suggested that this relatively welcoming environment can be partly attributed to Greece's own historical memory, which is deeply marked by experiences of refugeehood and displacement, most notably the Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922 that saw over a million Greeks become refugees.[37] This shared historical narrative of forced migration and loss may foster a degree of empathy. Indeed, a former Greek Minister for Migration, Ioannis Mouzalas, stated that Greeks and Kurds in Greece share "exceptional ties".[37] Similarly, Professor Emeritus of International Politics Christodoulos Yiallourides observed that "Greeks and Kurds have similar existences regarding the

preservation of their identities" in the face of external pressures.[37] However, it is also important to note that the refugee experience in Greece is not without challenges, and incidents of tension or attacks targeting Kurds in refugee camps have also been reported.[37] The presence and activities of the Kurdish diaspora in Greece have, at times, become a point of contention in Greece-Turkey relations. Turkey, which views the PKK as a terrorist organization and a primary national security threat, has frequently accused Greece, particularly during the 1990s and more recently, of harboring PKK militants and allowing its territory to be used for anti-Turkish activities.[37] The Lavrion refugee camp, southeast of Athens, has been a particular focus of these allegations, with Turkish officials and media claiming it serves as a PKK training, recruitment, and logistical hub.[42] This situation creates a delicate diplomatic balancing act for Greece, which must weigh its humanitarian obligations and commitments to freedom of expression for the Kurdish diaspora against the geopolitical realities of its often-fraught relationship with its NATO ally, Turkey.

The shared historical consciousness of being a refugee or striving to preserve a distinct identity against a more powerful, often assimilationist, state apparatus appears to create a unique foundation for empathy between segments of the Greek population and Kurdish individuals and groups. This grassroots understanding, rooted in historical parallels, can influence Greek public opinion to be more sympathetic towards Kurdish aspirations for cultural rights and self-determination than might be the case in other European nations lacking such direct historical resonances. Nevertheless, this public sympathy does not always translate directly into official Greek foreign policy, which is constrained by a complex array of regional alliances, national interests, and international obligations, particularly concerning its relationship with Turkey.

B. Greek Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question

Greek foreign policy concerning the multifaceted Kurdish question exhibits a degree of pragmatic differentiation, distinguishing between officially recognized autonomous entities, proscribed militant groups, and emergent political actors in the volatile Middle Eastern landscape. This approach is heavily influenced by Greece's own geostrategic interests, its complex relationship with Turkey, and its commitments as a member of the European Union and NATO.

Official Stance on Kurdish Autonomy and Entities:

Regarding the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, Greece has established formal diplomatic ties. It maintains a Consulate General in Erbil, which was upgraded from a trade office around 2016-2017, signaling a deepening of relations.41 In 2017, then Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias characterized the KRG as possessing a significant geostrategic role and being an important component of Greek geostrategic policy in the region.41 Concerning the KRG's 2017 independence referendum, Kotzias noted that such a referendum was a right provided for under the Iraqi constitution, a stance that, while not an outright endorsement of secession, acknowledged Kurdish aspirations within a legal framework.41 Support for the referendum and the broader Kurdish right to self-determination was also voiced by figures within the New Democracy party, which is currently the governing party in Greece.41

Furthermore, Greece has provided tangible support to the KRG, including humanitarian aid and military assistance in the form of Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition to the Peshmerga forces in their fight against ISIS.41

With respect to the **Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)**, often referred to as Rojava, Greece's official position is more emergent and cautious. Athens has expressed a general preference for some form of autonomous existence for the Kurdish population within Syria and has emphasized the need for the protection of all minority groups, including Kurds, and their full inclusion in any future Syrian political process [[12] (13.1), [52]]. Conferences discussing the Kurdish issue, including the situation in Rojava, have been held in Athens, involving Greek journalists, academics, and sometimes Kurdish representatives, indicating a level of engagement and interest.[46] Greek public opinion, as previously noted, tends to be sympathetic to the plight of Syrian Kurds.[47]

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Öcalan Affair, and the Lavrion Camp:

The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union, of which Greece is a member state.48 This designation significantly constrains Greece's official interactions with the group.

The **Öcalan Affair** in 1999 remains a deeply sensitive and damaging episode in Greek-Kurdish relations, particularly with PKK sympathizers. PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya after having sought refuge in various countries, including a brief and controversial stay in Greece and at the Greek embassy in Nairobi. The perception among many Kurds, including prominent figures like Murat Karayilan, was that the Greek government of then-Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos played a role, whether through complicity or ineptitude, that facilitated Öcalan's capture by Turkish intelligence services.[7] This event was widely seen as a "betrayal of friendship" and caused a "deep trauma," severely undermining the trust that had existed, especially between Greek leftist political circles and the PKK.[47]

The **Lavrion refugee camp** near Athens has been a persistent source of tension in Greco-Turkish relations. Turkey has repeatedly accused Greece of allowing the camp to be used as a safe haven and operational base for the PKK, alleging that it serves as a center for recruitment, training, and political propaganda.[37] Turkish officials have gone as far as calling Athens a "safe haven" for the PKK and other groups it deems terrorist organizations.[42] Greek authorities have generally denied these accusations, maintaining that the camp operates under humanitarian principles. A Greek government spokesperson stated in 2016 that "there is no PKK issue in the camp but if someone wants to peacefully declare his political identity he is free to do so in Greece," highlighting a stance that attempts to balance security concerns with freedom of expression for refugees [[12] (6.1)]. Nevertheless, Greek media reports have occasionally shown PKK symbols or portraits of Öcalan within the camp, which Turkish sources cite as evidence for their claims.[42]

Humanitarian Aid and Asylum Policies:

Beyond military aid to the Peshmerga, Greece has a track record of providing humanitarian assistance to Kurdish populations. Notably, Greece maintains a relatively high acceptance rate for Kurdish asylum seekers compared to other refugee groups, as stated by Patroklos

Georgiadis, the Greek Secretary General for Migration Policy (formerly Refugees).50 This policy is applied on a case-by-case basis, irrespective of the asylum seeker's specific country of origin within the Kurdish regions.50

Positions of Major Greek Political Parties:

- **New Democracy (Nea Dimokratia - ND):** As the current center-right governing party, its stance is reflected in official government policy. Historically, prominent ND figures like Adonis Georgiadis (currently a minister, formerly Vice-President) expressed support for the KRG's 2017 independence referendum and the Kurdish right to self-determination.[41]
- **SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left):** Historically, Greek leftist groups, from which SYRIZA has roots, demonstrated strong sympathy and even support for the PKK's struggle, often viewing it through an anti-imperialist and national liberation lens.[47] The Öcalan affair strained these informal ties. While in government (2015-2019), SYRIZA's foreign policy, led by Nikos Kotzias (who later formed his own movement but was initially with SYRIZA), established the consulate in Erbil and articulated the geostrategic importance of the KRG. General sympathy for Kurdish rights and self-determination, particularly in opposition to Turkish policies, remains a characteristic of the Greek left.
- **PASOK - Movement for Change (PASOK-KINAL):** The PASOK government under Costas Simitis was in power during the Öcalan affair and bore the brunt of Kurdish and domestic criticism for its handling of the situation.[47] Contemporary PASOK-KINAL generally aligns with EU positions on foreign policy matters, likely advocating for Kurdish rights within the framework of international law and the territorial integrity of existing states.

Overall, Greek foreign policy towards the Kurdish question reflects a pragmatic duality. There is official engagement and support for recognized, relatively stable autonomous entities like the KRG, which is perceived as a constructive actor in a volatile region and potentially aligns with Greek geostrategic interests.[41] This contrasts with a more cautious, legally constrained approach towards groups like the PKK, which is designated as terrorist by the EU and NATO, and towards the still-evolving AANES in Syria. This duality is an attempt by Greece to navigate its ideological inclinations (such as support for self-determination and human rights) with the complex realities of its geopolitical environment, especially its sensitive relationship with Turkey and its obligations as an EU and NATO member.

Turkish foreign policy and its security-centric view of the Kurdish issue, particularly concerning the PKK and its affiliates, act as a significant external constraint on the depth and openness of Greek-Kurdish relations, especially at the official state level. Turkey views any external sympathy or support for Kurdish groups it considers separatist or terrorist as a direct threat to its national security and territorial integrity.[33] Persistent and often aggressive Turkish accusations against Greece regarding the Lavrion camp or alleged historical support for the PKK [42] mean that Greece, as a neighboring state with its own multifaceted and often tense relationship with Turkey [52], must carefully calibrate any actions related to Kurdish groups against potential Turkish reactions. This dynamic likely compels official Greek policy towards Kurdish militant or unrecognized political groups to be more circumspect than Greek public

opinion or historical sympathies might otherwise dictate. The "betrayal" perceived by some Kurdish factions over the Öcalan affair can be partly understood within this context of immense Turkish pressure on Greece.

C. The Republic of Cyprus and the Kurdish Question

The Republic of Cyprus's approach to the Kurdish question is inevitably and profoundly shaped by its own national experience, particularly the ongoing Cyprus Problem, which involves the island's de facto division since the 1974 Turkish invasion and the continued occupation of its northern territory by Turkish forces.[54] This unresolved conflict with Turkey serves as the primary lens through which Cyprus views regional issues, including those involving Kurdish aspirations for self-determination and autonomy.

Official Stance on Kurdish Self-Determination and Entities:

Direct and comprehensive official statements from the Republic of Cyprus explicitly detailing its stance on Kurdish self-determination in general, or on specific entities like the KRG in Iraq or the AANES (Rojava) in Syria, are not extensively covered in the provided material. However, recent diplomatic activity indicates a willingness to engage with recognized Kurdish entities. In April 2025, a Cypriot delegation, including the Political Affairs Director at the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited the KRG in Erbil and reaffirmed Cyprus's desire to deepen cooperation across political and cultural fields [12 (5.1)]. This engagement was framed in the context of Cyprus increasing its outreach to Middle Eastern countries and regions that prioritize religious coexistence and minority protection, values that align with the KRG's stated policies.57

The pervasive influence of the Cyprus Problem means that the Republic of Cyprus is inherently cautious regarding issues of separatism and the violation of territorial integrity under international law. Its own struggle against an unrecognized secessionist entity in its north—the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), which is recognized only by Turkey [54]—makes Nicosia a staunch defender of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any Kurdish movements perceived as undermining these principles without broad international consensus would likely be viewed with reservation.

Relations with Turkey and Accusations Regarding the PKK:

Relations between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey are exceptionally strained due to the Cyprus Problem.54 Cyprus officially views Turkey as an occupying power. This antagonistic relationship influences Cyprus's perception of Turkey's actions in other regional contexts, including its policies towards the Kurds.

Accusations regarding Cypriot support for the PKK have primarily emanated from Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials. For instance, Ersin Tatar, the president of the "TRNC," has accused the Greek Cypriot Administration (the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Cyprus) of supporting the PKK, citing historical instances such as the alleged issuance of a Cypriot diplomatic passport to Abdullah Öcalan under a pseudonym prior to his capture, and allowing the PKK to open a representative office in Cyprus [[12] (10.2)]. These claims align with Turkey's broader narrative of portraying entities that challenge its policies as supporters of terrorism. The Republic of Cyprus's official response to such specific allegations is not

detailed in the provided snippets, but it generally rejects claims that it supports terrorism.
Human Rights Context and Diaspora:
The presence of a Kurdish community and related activism in Cyprus is indicated by a U.S. State Department human rights report that mentions the "Cypriot-Kurdish Solidarity Association" in connection with the detention of Kenan Ayaz, a Kurdish activist, pending extradition to Germany.59 This suggests some level of organized Kurdish presence and advocacy on the island. In contrast, reports from the Turkish-controlled northern part of Cyprus indicate the deportation of Kurdish students by "TRNC" authorities.60
The foreign policy of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the Kurdish question is characterized by a complex balancing act. On one hand, there is a natural, albeit often unstated, sympathy for groups that are also in conflict with or repressed by Turkey, its primary adversary. The shared experience of facing Turkish military power and expansionist policies can create a basis for understanding. This is reflected in the growing engagement with the KRG, particularly focusing on shared values like minority protection and cultural cooperation [[12] (5.1)]. On the other hand, Cyprus's own traumatic history with secessionism and foreign occupation makes it a strong proponent of international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This principle would make Nicosia wary of openly endorsing Kurdish independence movements that lack broad international legitimacy or that might be seen as destabilizing existing states in the region, as such endorsement could be used to undermine its own arguments against the "TRNC."
Accusations of Cypriot support for the PKK, frequently voiced by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials [[12] (10.2)], are likely part of a wider geopolitical strategy by Ankara. This strategy aims to delegitimize the Republic of Cyprus on the international stage, to counter any perceived solidarity between Greek Cypriots and Kurds, and to deflect attention from Turkey's own actions in Cyprus and its policies towards its Kurdish population. For the Republic of Cyprus, such accusations necessitate a cautious public stance regarding Kurdish militant groups, even if there is underlying sympathy for the broader Kurdish cause due to the common challenge posed by Turkish policies.

D. Geopolitical Dimensions in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a critical geopolitical arena, characterized by newfound energy resources, persistent regional conflicts, and the interplay of local and international powers. The relationships between Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, and various Kurdish entities are increasingly interwoven with these broader regional dynamics.
Greece and Cyprus share profound geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. These include the preservation of a stable geopolitical equilibrium, ensuring the security and sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus, managing migration flows, protecting ethnic and religious minorities in the wider region, and fostering a secure periphery for the European Union.[52] Both nations are particularly wary of Turkish actions perceived as aiming for regional hegemony or challenging their sovereign rights, especially concerning maritime boundaries and energy exploration.[52] The discovery of significant natural gas reserves has intensified these dynamics, with the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF)—comprising Greece,

Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Italy, France, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, but notably excluding Turkey—representing an effort to foster energy cooperation among littoral states.[52] Kurdish political entities, particularly the KRG in Iraq and the AANES in Syria, are also navigating this complex environment. Their primary objectives revolve around achieving and maintaining autonomy, security, and economic viability. Their relationships with neighboring states, especially Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, are paramount. A potential, though complex, common interest could arise between Greece/Cyprus and certain Kurdish entities based on a shared desire to counterbalance or contain specific aspects of Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, Greece has officially stated that it favors some form of autonomous existence for Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq [52], and the former Greek Foreign Minister described the KRG as having a geostrategic role relevant to Greek policy.[41]

However, the path to any formal strategic alignment is fraught with complexities. Kurdish entities are largely non-state or sub-state actors, and their primary security and political concerns are deeply embedded in the internal dynamics of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Greece, as a NATO member, and both Greece and Cyprus as EU members, operate within different alliance structures and have broader foreign policy agendas. Furthermore, the KRG's relationship with Turkey is notably intricate, often characterized by a pragmatic necessity for cooperation (e.g., for oil exports through Turkish pipelines, and sometimes in security matters related to the PKK) despite underlying political differences and historical grievances.[1] This "frenemy" dynamic can complicate any straightforward anti-Turkish alignment with Greece or Cyprus. The internal political landscape among Kurds is also fragmented, with historical rivalries such as that between the KDP and PUK in Iraqi Kurdistan [1], and differing approaches among various Kurdish parties across the region.

The role of the United States is another critical variable, as Washington maintains strategic alliances with Greece and Turkey, and has engaged with various Kurdish factions, including the KRG and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), primarily in the context of combating ISIS.[51] US policy shifts can significantly impact the leverage and options available to all regional actors.

While a shared adversary in the form of certain Turkish government policies might suggest a natural basis for alignment between Greece/Cyprus and some Kurdish groups, the intricate and often contradictory relationships that Kurdish entities (especially the KRG) maintain with Turkey, coupled with their own internal divisions, render consistent, formal strategic cooperation highly challenging. Greek and Cypriot foreign policy must navigate this complex Kurdish political terrain, making broad strategic partnerships difficult to forge and sustain beyond issue-specific or tacit understandings.

The energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean could, however, indirectly create a convergence of interests. Kurdish-controlled regions in both Iraq (KRG) and Syria (AANES) possess significant oil and gas reserves.[1] The KRG is already an oil exporter, though its routes and revenue sharing are often subjects of dispute with Baghdad and involve transit through Turkey.[1] If Turkey seeks to exert control over energy flows from these Kurdish regions in a manner that also impacts the broader energy geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean—for instance, by proposing pipeline routes that compete with or bypass Greek/Cypriot-backed

projects, or by destabilizing Kurdish areas to assert energy dominance—then a commonality of interest could emerge. This remains a potential future development rather than a current, actualized alignment, contingent on the evolution of energy infrastructure, political stability in Kurdish regions, and the strategic choices of regional and global powers. Greece's stated geostrategic interest in the KRG could, in part, be motivated by such long-term energy and stability considerations in the wider neighborhood.

VI. Analysis and Concluding Perspectives

The relationship between the Greek and Kurdish peoples, spanning millennia from ancient encounters to contemporary geopolitical maneuvering, is a testament to the enduring complexities of identity, power, and survival in one of the world's most historically contested regions. This analysis has traced their interactions through the Byzantine and Ottoman imperial eras, the crucible of early 20th-century nation-state formation, and the ongoing struggles and alignments of the modern day.

Recapitulation of Key Dynamics:

Historically, Greek-Kurdish interactions were largely framed by their shared or proximate existence within larger imperial structures. This led to a spectrum of engagement, from military cooperation and pragmatic alliances, such as Kurdish Khurramites serving in the Byzantine army 12 or Kurdish tribes allying with the Ottomans at Chaldiran 22, to periods of conflict, imperial suppression, and inter-communal violence, often instigated or exacerbated by the policies of the ruling empires.15 The Ottoman strategy of divide et impera was particularly impactful, at times pitting communities against each other or selectively empowering certain factions to maintain central control.

The early 20th century, particularly the post-World War I settlements, marked a critical divergence in their paths. The Treaty of Sèvres briefly held out the promise of statehood or significant autonomy for both Armenians and Kurds, alongside territorial gains for Greece in Anatolia.[20] However, the triumph of Turkish nationalism and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 dramatically altered this landscape. For Greece, Lausanne, while entailing the traumatic loss of Anatolian Hellenism and the Asia Minor Catastrophe, ultimately led to the consolidation of its nation-state, albeit within reduced borders.[20] For the Kurds, Lausanne formalized their division among four newly configured or consolidated nation-states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria) and denied them the prospect of their own state, embedding deep-seated grievances that continue to fuel their political aspirations and struggles to this day.[1]

Contemporary relations are characterized by a notable degree of grassroots sympathy and solidarity from segments of the Greek public towards Kurdish causes, often fueled by an active Kurdish diaspora in Greece.[37] This is juxtaposed with the more cautious and pragmatic foreign policies of the Greek and Cypriot states. These official policies must navigate a complex web of national interests, regional stability concerns, alliance commitments (EU, and NATO for Greece), and, crucially, the ever-present factor of relations with Turkey.

Enduring Themes:

Several enduring themes emerge from this long historical interaction:

1. **Shared Experiences of Displacement and Minority Status:** Both Greeks (particularly

Anatolian Greeks) and Kurds have profound historical experiences of existing as distinct ethno-cultural or religious communities within larger, often dominant, empires. Both have faced periods of persecution, policies of assimilation, and mass displacement. This shared historical trauma appears to foster a degree of empathy, particularly at the societal level in Greece, where the memory of the 1922 refugee crisis remains potent.[37]

2. **The Defining Impact of Turkish State Policies:** The policies of the Ottoman Empire and, subsequently, the Republic of Turkey have been a dominant, often determining, factor shaping not only the individual destinies of Greek and Kurdish populations but also the nature of their mutual relationship. Turkish nationalist ideologies, which historically sought to create a homogenous nation-state, led to the suppression of Kurdish identity and aspirations [1] and were central to the historical antagonism with Greece.[52] This creates a complex triangular dynamic where Greek-Kurdish relations are often influenced, if not dictated, by their respective interactions with Ankara.
3. **Geopolitical Pragmatism versus Ideological Solidarity:** The official policies of Greece and Cyprus often reflect a pragmatic approach. While there may be ideological sympathy for Kurdish self-determination or human rights, state actions are primarily guided by national interests, the imperative of regional stability, and commitments to international alliances. This is evident in the cautious handling of issues related to the PKK, the complexities of the Öcalan affair [49], and the carefully calibrated engagement with Kurdish autonomous regions like the KRG in Iraq and the AANES in Syria.
4. **The "Other" in Nation-Building:** The nation-building projects of the 20th century in the region often involved defining national identity against a perceived "other." For the Turkish Republic, this process included the assimilationist policies towards Kurds and the earlier conflict and population exchange with Greeks. For Greece, the "Turk" often served as a significant "other" against whom modern Greek identity was forged, particularly in the context of the War of Independence and subsequent tensions. Kurds, in their own protracted struggle for self-determination, have found themselves cast as the "other" by multiple states in the region.

Assessment of Current State and Future Trajectories:

The contemporary relationship between Greeks and Kurds remains fundamentally asymmetrical: the Kurds are a large stateless nation striving for greater rights, autonomy, and, for some, independence, often seeking support from established states like Greece and Cyprus. Greece and Cyprus, as sovereign states, must formulate their policies within the existing international system and their own national security and foreign policy constraints. Grassroots solidarity in Greece for Kurdish causes, manifested through diaspora activism, public discourse, and cultural exchange, is likely to persist. This is sustained by historical narratives of shared suffering and contemporary perceptions of Turkish government policies. Official Greek and Cypriot support will likely continue to be most tangible and visible for recognized and relatively stable Kurdish entities like the KRG in Iraq, especially when such engagement aligns with their geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as regional stability, energy cooperation, and the counterbalancing of other regional powers.[41] Support for Kurdish groups in Syria, such as the AANES, will likely remain contingent on the

broader evolution of the Syrian conflict, the positions of major international actors, and, critically, the actions and reactions of Turkey.

The shadow of Greek-Turkish relations will undoubtedly continue to heavily influence the scope and nature of overt Greek and Cypriot support for Kurdish aspirations. Any significant improvement in Greek-Turkish relations might lead to a downplaying of the "Kurdish card" by Athens and Nicosia. Conversely, heightened tensions with Ankara could see a renewed, albeit still cautious, interest in leveraging Kurdish issues.

Ultimately, the Kurdish people's ongoing pursuit of greater rights, recognition, and autonomy will remain a significant and often destabilizing factor in Middle Eastern geopolitics. This will continue to impact Greece and Cyprus through various channels, including refugee flows, diplomatic pressures from regional and international actors, and the intricate, ever-shifting web of alliances and rivalries in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Greek-Kurdish relationship, therefore, is often a "relationship by proxy," heavily mediated and influenced by their respective and frequently antagonistic interactions with Turkey. Direct bilateral engagement, while growing in specific areas such as Greece-KRG ties, is frequently overshadowed or constrained by this overarching triangular dynamic. While the concept of "shared victimhood" or a "shared enemy" (vis-à-vis certain Turkish policies) can foster solidarity, it has historically proven insufficient as a foundation for a stable, long-term strategic alliance. This is due to the differing geopolitical priorities, power asymmetries between Greece and Cyprus as established states and various Kurdish non-state or sub-state actors, and the internal complexities of Kurdish politics.

The future trajectory of Greek-Kurdish relations may increasingly be shaped by developments within the Kurdish regions themselves—such as the consolidation, stability, and international recognition of entities like the KRG and AANES, and the potential resolution of internal Kurdish conflicts. Furthermore, broader geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, involving powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel, could create new geopolitical spaces where Greek and Kurdish interests might converge or diverge, potentially with less direct mediation through the lens of Turkish relations. As Kurdish entities mature politically and economically, their interactions with Greece and Cyprus might diversify, focusing more on areas like energy, trade, and cultural exchange, rather than being predominantly viewed through the prism of the "Kurdish question" as it relates to Turkey and regional conflict.

VII. Works Cited

1. [1] The Kurdish Project. "Kurdish History." *thekurdishproject.org*. (https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-history/)
2. [65] Peter Lang Publishing. "Kurdish People, History and Politics." *peterlang.com*. (https://www.peterlang.com/series/kphp)
3. [66] Fiveable. "Modern Perspectives on Ancient Greece." *fiveable.me*. (https://fiveable.me/ancient-greece/unit-14/modern-perspectives-ancient-greece/study-guide/xtADsuLW1MgIhHUG)
4. [67] History.com. "Ancient Greece Democracy." *history.com*. (https://www.history.com/articles/ancient-greece-democracy)

5. [20] Wikipedia GR. "Κούρδοι (Kurds)." *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9) (Specifically the section on the 20th century)
6. [68] SLPress. "Το κουρδικό εθνικοαπελευθερωτικό κίνημα στη Συρία (The Kurdish national liberation movement in Syria)." *slpress.gr*. (https://slpress.gr/diethni/to-kourdiko-ethnikoapeleftherotiko-kinima-sti-siria/)
7. [25] Demokratik Modernite. "Kürt Kültüründe Ahlaki Politik Direniş ve Zerdüştün Sesi Üzerine (On Moral Political Resistance in Kurdish Culture and the Voice of Zoroaster)." *demokratikmodernite.org*. (https://demokratikmodernite.org/kurt-kulturunde-ahlaki-politik-direnis-ve-zerdustun-sesi-uzerine/)
8. [2] Kurdistan Regional Government. "History." *gov.krd*. (https://gov.krd/boi-en/why-kurdistan/region/history/)
9. [12] Quora. "Were there any Kurds living in the Byzantine Empire?" *quora.com*. (https://www.quora.com/Were-there-any-Kurds-living-in-the-Byzantine-Empire) (Contains extracted answer content regarding Khurramites)
10. [18] Holy Cross Tiles. "Who Were the Byzantines?" *chertseytiles.holycross.edu*. (https://chertseytiles.holycross.edu/crusades/who-were-the-byzantines/)
11. [19] Britannica. "Byzantine Empire." *britannica.com*. (https://www.britannica.com/place/Byzantine-Empire)
12. [22] Wikipedia EN. "Ottoman Kurds." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Kurds)
13. [23] Wikipedia EN. "Ottoman Kurdistan." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Kurdistan)
14. [5] Wikipedia EN. "Ottoman Greeks." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Greeks)
15. [11] University of Michigan Library. "All the Sultan's Men: The Ottoman Empire and its Greeks." *apps.lib.umich.edu*. (https://apps.lib.umich.edu/online-exhibits/exhibits/show/200th-anniversary-greek-war/all-the-sultans)
16. [6] Wikipedia EN. "Kurdish nationalism." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_nationalism)
17. [7] Council on Foreign Relations. "The Kurds' Long Struggle With Statelessness." *cfr.org*. (https://www.cfr.org/timeline/kurds-long-struggle-statelessness)
18. [8] Cambridge University Press. "Introduction: The Greeks at the beginning of the twentieth century." *cambridge.org*. (https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/edinburgh-history-of-the-greeks-20th-and-early-21st-centuries/introduction-the-greeks-at-the-beginning-of-the-twentieth-century/1EE10E8A27C4914671779783B30E4C70)
19. [10] The Kurdish Project. "Kurdish Culture." *thekurdishproject.org*. (https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-culture/)

20. [3] MIT Reddit Discussions. "Greek Heritage Explained: Racial Identity Insights." *discussions-reddit-ci.odl.mit.edu*. (https://discussions-reddit-ci.odl.mit.edu/greek-heritage-explained-racial-identity-insights)
21. [4] National Hellenic Museum. "Greek Identity White Paper." *nationalhellenicmuseum.org*. (https://nationalhellenicmuseum.org/greek-identity-white-paper/)
22. [12] Quora. "Were there any Kurds living in the Byzantine Empire?" *quora.com*. (https://www.quora.com/Were-there-any-Kurds-living-in-the-Byzantine-Empire) (Answer content for Karduchoi and Khurramites)
23. [13] Brill. "Historical Geography of Gordyene." *brill.com*. (https://brill.com/downloadpdf/book/9789004350724/B9789004350724_006.pdf)
24. [14] Anabasis Journal. "THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF GORDYENE. PART 1: CLASSICAL SOURCES." *journals.ur.edu.pl*. (https://journals.ur.edu.pl/anabasis/article/download/10176/9224/19208)
25. [69] Archaiologia Online. "Εκστρατεία αρχαιολόγων στα Γαυγάμηλα (Archaeological expedition to Gaugamela)." *archaiologia.gr*. (https://www.archaiologia.gr/blog/2011/07/11/%CE%B5%CE%BA%CF%83%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1-%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%87%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%BB%CF%8C%CE%B3%CF%89%CE%BD-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1-%CE%B3%CE%B1%CF%85%CE%B3%CE%AC%CE%BC%CE%B7%CE%BB/)
26. [49] Dimokratia. "Σημίτης και Πάγκαλος «πρόδωσαν» τη φιλία Ελλήνων και Κούρδων! (Simitis and Pangalos "betrayed" the friendship of Greeks and Kurds!)." *dimokratia.gr*. (https://www.dimokratia.gr/ellada/216981/simitis-kai-pagkalos-prodosan-ti-filia-ellinon-kai/)
27. [48] Wikipedia EN. "Kurdistan Workers' Party." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party)
28. [54] Wikipedia EN. "Cyprus problem." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_problem)
29. [59] U.S. Department of State. "2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cyprus." *state.gov*. (https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cyprus/)
30. [37] Wikipedia EN. "Kurds in Greece." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurds_in_Greece)
31. [38] Joshua Project. "Kurd, Kurmanji in Greece." *joshuaproject.net*. (https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/12877/GR)
32. [37] Wikipedia EN. "Kurds in Greece." (Focusing on public opinion aspects) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurds_in_Greece)
33. [47] Quora. "What do the Greek people think of the Kurds..." *quora.com*. (https://www.quora.com/What-do-the-Greek-people-think-of-the-Kurds-do-they-support-the-departure-of-the-Kurds-from-Turkey-and-the-creation-of-a-state-in-eastern-

Turkey) (Contains extracted answer content)
34. [29] AHRC Surrey. "Ottoman Pogroms." *ahrc.surrey.ac.uk*. (https://ahrc.surrey.ac.uk/case-studies/ottoman/)
35. [26] Wikipedia EN. "Pontic Greek genocide." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pontic_Greek_genocide)
36. [15] Wikipedia EN. "Armenian–Kurdish relations." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian%E2%80%93Kurdish_relations)
37. [31] EVN Report. "Armenians and Kurds: A Complex and Strategic Relationship." *evnreport.com*. (https://evnreport.com/politics/armenians-and-kurds-a-complex-and-strategic-relationship/)
38. [34] The Lausanne Project. "A Peace of Their Mind." *thelausanneproject.com*. (https://thelausanneproject.com/2024/03/22/a-peace-of-their-mind/)
39. [32] Kurdshop. "Lausanne, a Treaty that Abolished the Establishment of Kurdish State." *kurdshop.net*. (https://kurdshop.net/en/history/2123)
40. [52] China-CEE Institute. "Greece External Relations Briefing: Greece and the New Middle East." *china-cee.eu*. (https://china-cee.eu/2025/02/10/greece-external-relations-briefing-greece-and-the-new-middle-east/)
41. [61] AEI Pitt. "The Eastern Mediterranean in the Eye of the Storm." *aei.pitt.edu*. (https://aei.pitt.edu/42920/1/SPB43.pdf)
42. [51] Reddit. "So what exactly is the root of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict?" *reddit.com/r/kurdistan*. (https://www.reddit.com/r/kurdistan/comments/15dwg8o/so_what_exactly_is_the_root_of_the_kurdishturkish/)
43. [33] Wikipedia EN. "Human rights of Kurdish people in Turkey." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_of_Kurdish_people_in_Turkey)
44. [21] Emfietzoglou.gr. "ΑΝΑΔΡΟΜΗ (Retrospection - on Kurds)." *emfietzoglou.gr*. (https://emfietzoglou.gr/1234/)
45. [39] Wikipedia GR. "Κούρδοι στην Ελλάδα (Kurds in Greece)." *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9_%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD_%CE%95%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1)
46. [40] Iefimerida. "Έλληνες αναρχικοί πολεμούν τζιχαντιστές στο δυτικό Κουρδιστάν (Greek anarchists fight jihadists in western Kurdistan)." *iefimerida.gr*. (https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/339878/ellines-anarhikoi-polemoyn-tzihantistes-sto-dytiko-koyrdistan-eikones-vinteo)
47. [50] Rudaw TR. Interview with Patroklos Georgiadis on Greek policy towards Kurdish migrants. *rudaw.net*. (https://www.rudaw.net/turkish/interview/23102021)
48. [46] Hawar News. "Atina'da Kürt Sorunu Konferansı (Kurdish Issue Conference in Athens)." *hawarnews.com*. (https://hawarnews.com/tr/atinada-kurt-sorunu-konferansi)

49. [60] Bianet. "Kuzey Kıbrıs 16 Kürt Öğrenciyi Sınır Dışı Etti (Northern Cyprus Deports 16 Kurdish Students)." *bianet.org*. (https://bianet.org/haber/kuzey-kibris-16-kurt-ogrenciyi-sinir-disi-etti-133646)
50. [27] Wikipedia TR. "Rum Kırımı (Greek Genocide/Pontic Genocide)." *tr.wikipedia.org*. (https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum_K%C4%B1r%C4%B1m%C4%B1)
51. [30] DergiPark. "Pontus Sorunu: Tarihi Seyri ve Çözüm Çalışmaları (The Pontus Problem: Historical Course and Solution Efforts)." *dergipark.org.tr*. (https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/113437)
52. [35] DergiPark. "Lozan Antlaşması ve Kürtler (The Treaty of Lausanne and the Kurds)." *dergipark.org.tr*. (https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/4580259)
53. [36] Kovaradilop. "Lozan Antlaşması ve Kürtler (The Treaty of Lausanne and the Kurds)." *kovaradilop.net*. (https://www.kovaradilop.net/2023/12/01/lozan-antlasmasi-ve-kurtler/)
54. [64] The New Arab. "Kurds threaten to leave Baghdad gov't over salary, oil disputes." *newarab.com*. (https://www.newarab.com/news/kurds-threaten-leave-baghdad-govt-over-salary-oil-disputes)
55. [62] U.S. Department of State. "Secretary Rubio's Call with Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Barzani." *state.gov*. (https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-kurdistan-region-president-barzani/)
56. [63] Kurdistan24. "Syria's Kurds to insist on decentralised government in talks: official." *kurdistan24.net*. (https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/842571)
57. [70] Medya News. "Can the 1921 Constitution offer a basis for peace?" *medyanews.net*. (https://medyanews.net/can-the-1921-constitution-offer-a-basis-for-peace/) (Context on Turkish constitutional debates and Kurdish issue, mentions Greek occupation)
58. [54] Wikipedia EN. "Cyprus problem." (General context) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_problem)
59. [45] Wikipedia GR. "Ιρακινό Κουρδικό δημοψήφισμα ανεξαρτησίας 2017 (Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum 2017)." *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%99%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BA%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C_%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CF%8C_%CE%B4%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%88%CE%AE%CF%86%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B1_%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%BE%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%83%CE%AF%CE%B1%CF%82_2017)
60. [44] Kurdistan Regional Government DFR. "Consulate General of the Hellenic Republic." *gov.krd*. (https://gov.krd/dfr-en/foreign-representation/consulate-general-of-the-hellenic-republic/)
61. [41] Wikipedia EN. "Greece–Kurdistan Region relations." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece%E2%80%93Kurdistan_Region_relations)
62. [71] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye. "PKK." *mfa.gov.tr*.

(https://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk.en.mfa)
63. [72] Presidency of TRNC. "President Ersin Tatar: “I invite the Greek Cypriot Administration to review its relationship with terrorism..." *kktcb.org*. (https://www.kktcb.org/en/president-ersin-tatar-i-invite-the-greek-cypriot-administration-to-9865)
64. [48] Wikipedia EN. "Kurdistan Workers' Party." [48] *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party)
65. [42] TRT World. "Why is Greece playing host to PKK terrorists?" *trtworld.com*. (https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-greece-playing-host-to-pkk-terrorists-60714)
66. [73] 360info. "Is Erdogan using Kurdish peace talks to secure his political future?" *360info.org*. (https://360info.org/is-erdogan-using-kurdish-peace-talks-to-secure-his-political-future/)
67. [41] Wikipedia EN. "Greece–Kurdistan Region relations." [41] *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece%E2%80%93Kurdistan_Region_relations)
68. [16] Wikipedia EN. "Carduchii." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carduchii)
69. [17] Brill. "Political History of Gordyene." *brill.com*. (https://brill.com/display/book/9789004350724/B9789004350724_008.pdf)
70. [58] The Loop ECPR. "The Turkification of Kurdistan: the world looks on." *theloop.ecpr.eu*. (https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-turkification-of-kurdistan-the-world-looks-on/)
71. [53] Wikipedia EN. "Foreign relations of Greece." *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Greece)
72. [57] Kurdistan24. "Cyprus Delegation Reaffirms Commitment to Strengthening Ties with Kurdistan Region." *kurdistan24.net*. (https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/836655/cyprus-delegation-reaffirms-commitment-to-strengthening-ties-with-kurdistan-region)
73. [55] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye. "The Cyprus Issue." *mfa.gov.tr*. (https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-cyprus-issue.en.mfa)
74. [43] Middle East Eye. "PKK flags and Ocalan's face: Inside Greece's self-ruling Kurdish enclave." *middleeasteye.net*. (https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pkk-flags-and-ocalans-face-inside-greeces-self-ruling-kurdish-enclave)
75. [42] TRT World. "Why is Greece playing host to PKK terrorists?" [42] *trtworld.com*. (https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-greece-playing-host-to-pkk-terrorists-60714)
76. [28] Wikipedia GR. "Γενοκτονία των Ελλήνων του Πόντου (Genocide of the Pontic Greeks)." *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%93%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BA%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%AF%CE%B1_%CF%84%CF%89%CE%BD_%CE%95%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AE%CE%BD%CF%89%CE%BD_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_%CE%A0%CF%

8C%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85)
77. [56] Wikipedia GR. "Κυπριακό (ζήτημα) (Cyprus (issue))." *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CF%85%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%B1%CE%BA%CF%8C_(%CE%B6%CE%AE%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%B1)
78. [26] Wikipedia EN. "Pontic Greek genocide." [26] *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pontic_Greek_genocide)
79. [74] Hellas Journal. "Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: «We condemn the atrocities inflicted on innocent civilians, including Christians and Alawites in Syria»." *hellasjournal.com*. (https://hellasjournal.com/2025/03/greek-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-we-condemn-the-atrocities-inflicted-on-innocent-civilians-including-christians-and-alawites-in-syria/)
80. [20] Wikipedia GR. "Κούρδοι (Kurds)." Article last updated April 1, 2025. *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9) (Comprehensive historical overview, Byzantine, Ottoman, Sèvres)
81. [20] Wikipedia GR. "Κούρδοι (Kurds)." [20] *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9)
82. [12] Combined results from multiple queries on official statements and parliamentary debates from Greece and Cyprus. (Internal reference to synthesized search results)
83. [26] Wikipedia EN. "Pontic Greek genocide." (No specific detail on Kurd-Pontic Greek interactions) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pontic_Greek_genocide)
84. [49] Dimokratia. "Σημίτης και Πάγκαλος «πρόδωσαν» τη φιλία Ελλήνων και Κούρδων! (Simitis and Pangalos "betrayed" the friendship of Greeks and Kurds!)." (Interview with Murat Karayilan on Öcalan affair) *dimokratia.gr*. (https://www.dimokratia.gr/ellada/216981/simitis-kai-pagkalos-prodosan-ti-filia-ellinon-kai/)
85. [59] U.S. Department of State. "2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cyprus." (Mention of Cypriot-Kurdish Solidarity Association) *state.gov*. (https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cyprus/)
86. [37] Wikipedia EN. "Kurds in Greece." Article last updated April 1, 2025. (Diaspora activities, Turkish accusations) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurds_in_Greece)
87. [34] The Lausanne Project. "A Peace of Their Mind." (Kurdish and Turkish perspectives on Lausanne) *thelausanneproject.com*. (https://thelausanneproject.com/2024/03/22/a-peace-of-their-mind/)
88. [52] China-CEE Institute. "Greece External Relations Briefing: Greece and the New Middle East." (Greece favors Kurdish autonomy in Syria/Iraq; EEZ issues) *china-cee.eu*. (https://china-cee.eu/2025/02/10/greece-external-relations-briefing-greece-and-the-new-middle-east/)
89. [50] Rudaw TR. Interview with Patroklos Georgiadis on Greek asylum policy for Kurds.

Article last updated October 23, 2021. *rudaw.net*. (https://www.rudaw.net/turkish/interview/23102021)

90. [60] Bianet. "Kuzey Kıbrıs 16 Kürt Öğrenciyi Sınır Dışı Etti (Northern Cyprus Deports 16 Kurdish Students)." (Report on deportation from Northern Cyprus) *bianet.org*. (https://bianet.org/haber/kuzey-kibris-16-kurt-ogrenciyi-sinir-disi-etti-133646)
91. [15] Wikipedia EN. "Armenian–Kurdish relations." Article last updated May 25, 2025. (Hamidiye regiments, Sheikh Ubeydullah, Alevi Kurd protection of Armenians) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian%E2%80%93Kurdish_relations)
92. [69] Archaiologia Online. "Εκστρατεία αρχαιολόγων στα Γαυγάμηλα (Archaeological expedition to Gaugamela)." (Greek archaeological missions in Iraqi Kurdistan) *archaiologia.gr*. (https://www.archaiologia.gr/blog/2011/07/11/%CE%B5%CE%BA%CF%83%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1-%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%87%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%BB%CF%8C%CE%B3%CF%89%CE%BD-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1-%CE%B3%CE%B1%CF%85%CE%B3%CE%AC%CE%BC%CE%B7%CE%BB/)
93. [30] DergiPark. "Pontus Sorunu: Tarihi Seyri ve Çözüm Çalışmaları (The Pontus Problem: Historical Course and Solution Efforts)." Article last updated June 2014. (Turkish perspective on Pontus issue) *dergipark.org.tr*. (https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/113437)
94. [32] Kurdshop. "Lausanne, a Treaty that Abolished the Establishment of Kurdish State." (Kurdish perspectives on Sèvres and Lausanne) *kurdshop.net*. (https://kurdshop.net/en/history/2123)
95. [39] Wikipedia GR. "Κούρδοι στην Ελλάδα (Kurds in Greece)." Article last updated October 2, 2024. (Kurdish diaspora in Greece) *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9_%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD_%CE%95%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1)
96. [40] Iefimerida. "Έλληνες αναρχικοί πολεμούν τζιχαντιστές στο δυτικό Κουρδιστάν (Greek anarchists fight jihadists in western Kurdistan)." (Reports of Greek anarchists in Rojava; URL inaccessible to bot but title and context noted) *iefimerida.gr*. (https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/339878/ellines-anarhikoi-polemoyn-tzihantistes-sto-dytiko-koyrdistan-eikones-vinteo)
97. [46] Hawar News. "Atina'da Kürt Sorunu Konferansı (Kurdish Issue Conference in Athens)." (Conference in Athens on Kurdish issue in Syria) *hawarnews.com*. (https://hawarnews.com/tr/atinada-kurt-sorunu-konferansi)
98. [54] Wikipedia EN. "Cyprus problem." Article last updated May 29, 2025. (Context for Cyprus's foreign policy) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_problem)
99. [9] Wikipedia EN. "History of the Kurds." Article last updated May 25, 2025. (General Kurdish history, Ottoman period, nationalism) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Kurds)
100. [21] Emfietzoglou.gr. "ΑΝΑΔΡΟΜΗ (Retrospection - on Kurds)." (Kurdish interactions with Byzantines, submission to Islam) *emfietzoglou.gr*. (https://emfietzoglou.gr/1234/)

101. [20] Wikipedia GR. "Κούρδοι (Kurds)." [20] *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9)
102. [33] Wikipedia EN. "Human rights of Kurdish people in Turkey." (Turkish government perspective on Kurdish human rights) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_of_Kurdish_people_in_Turkey)
103. [61] AEI Pitt. "The Eastern Mediterranean in the Eye of the Storm." (Geopolitics, energy, role of Greece/Cyprus, mention of Kurdish problem in Turkey) *aei.pitt.edu*. (https://aei.pitt.edu/42920/1/SPB43.pdf)
104. [27] Wikipedia TR. "Rum Kırımı (Greek Genocide/Pontic Genocide)." (Turkish perspective on Pontic Greek issue) *tr.wikipedia.org*. (https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum_K%C4%B1r%C4%B1m%C4%B1)
105. [35] DergiPark. "Lozan Antlaşması ve Kürtler (The Treaty of Lausanne and the Kurds)." Article last updated April 25, 2025. (Kurdish views on Lausanne) *dergipark.org.tr*. (https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/4580259)
106. [36] Kovaradilop. "Lozan Antlaşması ve Kürtler (The Treaty of Lausanne and the Kurds)." Article last updated December 21, 2023. (Minority provisions in Lausanne and Şark Islahat Planı) *kovaradilop.net*. (https://www.kovaradilop.net/2023/12/01/lozan-antlasmasi-ve-kurtler/)
107. [7] Council on Foreign Relations. "The Kurds' Long Struggle With Statelessness." (Mention of Öcalan's arrest) *cfr.org*. (https://www.cfr.org/timeline/kurds-long-struggle-statelessness)
108. [1] The Kurdish Project. "Kurdish History." (General Kurdish history, Ottoman interactions, nationalism) *thekurdishproject.org*. (https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-history/)
109. [24] DergiPark. "Untitled article on Kurdish emirates." (Kurdish socio-political organization, Ottoman interactions) *dergipark.org.tr*. (https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/184120)
110. [25] Demokratik Modernite. "Kürt Kültüründe Ahlaki Politik Direniş Ve Zerdüşt'ün Sesi Üzerine." (Kurdish cultural resistance, limited Ottoman interaction details) *demokratikmodernite.org*. (https://demokratikmodernite.org/kurt-kulturunde-ahlaki-politik-direnis-ve-zerdustun-sesi-uzerine/)
111. [4] National Hellenic Museum. "Greek Identity White Paper." (Greek culture and identity) *nationalhellenicmuseum.org*. (https://nationalhellenicmuseum.org/greek-identity-white-paper/)
112. [45] Wikipedia GR. "Ιρακινό Κουρδικό δημοψήφισμα ανεξαρτησίας 2017 (Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum 2017)." (Greek Foreign Minister statement on KRG referendum) *el.wikipedia.org*. (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%99%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BA%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C_%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CF%8C_%CE%B4%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%88%CE%AE%CF%86%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%

CE%B1_%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%BE%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%83%CE%AF%CE%B1%CF%82_2017)

113. [44] Kurdistan Regional Government DFR. "Consulate General of the Hellenic Republic." (Details of Greek Consulate in Erbil) *gov.krd*. (https://gov.krd/dfr-en/foreign-representation/consulate-general-of-the-hellenic-republic/)
114. [41] Wikipedia EN. "Greece–Kurdistan Region relations." Article last updated March 3, 2025. (Greek position on KRG referendum, aid, bilateral relations) *en.wikipedia.org*. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece%E2%80%93Kurdistan_Region_relations)
115. [42] TRT World. "Why is Greece playing host to PKK terrorists?" (Turkish accusations about Lavrion camp) *trtworld.com*. (https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-greece-playing-host-to-pkk-terrorists-60714)
116. [73] 360info. "Is Erdogan using Kurdish peace talks to secure his political future?" (No direct info on Greek party positions) *360info.org*. (https://360info.org/is-erdogan-using-kurdish-peace-talks-to-secure-his-political-future/)

Works cited

1. Learn About Kurdish History | The Kurdish Project, accessed June 5, 2025, https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-history/
2. Region | History - GOV.KRD, accessed June 5, 2025, https://gov.krd/boi-en/why-kurdistan/region/history/
3. Greek Heritage Explained: Racial Identity Insights - Reddit ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://discussions-reddit-ci.odl.mit.edu/greek-heritage-explained-racial-identity-insights
4. Greek Identity White Paper - National Hellenic Museum, accessed June 5, 2025, https://nationalhellenicmuseum.org/greek-identity-white-paper/
5. Ottoman Greeks - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Greeks
6. Kurdish nationalism - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_nationalism
7. Timeline: The Kurds' Long Struggle With Statelessness, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/kurds-long-struggle-statelessness
8. Introduction: The Greeks at the beginning of the twentieth century ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/edinburgh-history-of-the-greeks-20th-and-early-21st-centuries/introduction-the-greeks-at-the-beginning-of-the-twentieth-century/1EE10E8A27C4914671779783B30E4C70
9. History of the Kurds - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Kurds
10. Learn About Kurdish Culture | The Kurdish Project, accessed June 5, 2025,

https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-culture/
11. All the Sultan's Men : The Ottoman Empire and its Greeks · Online Exhibits, accessed June 5, 2025, https://apps.lib.umich.edu/online-exhibits/exhibits/show/200th-anniversary-greek-war/all-the-sultans
12. Were there any Kurds living in the Byzantine Empire? - Quora, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.quora.com/Were-there-any-Kurds-living-in-the-Byzantine-Empire
13. PART 2 Gordyene - Brill, accessed June 5, 2025, https://brill.com/downloadpdf/book/9789004350724/B9789004350724_006.pdf
14. ANABASIS, accessed June 5, 2025, https://journals.ur.edu.pl/anabasis/article/download/10176/9224/19208
15. Armenian–Kurdish relations - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian%E2%80%93Kurdish_relations
16. Carduchii - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carduchii
17. Political History of Gordyene - Brill, accessed June 5, 2025, https://brill.com/display/book/9789004350724/B9789004350724_008.pdf
18. Who were the Byzantines? -, accessed June 5, 2025, https://chertseytiles.holycross.edu/crusades/who-were-the-byzantines/
19. Byzantine Empire | History, Geography, Maps, & Facts | Britannica, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/place/Byzantine-Empire
20. Κούρδοι - Βικιπαίδεια, accessed June 5, 2025, https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9
21. Κουρδιστάν, Αναδρομή - Επιρροές - Εξελίξεις - Πρόδρομος ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://emfietzoglou.gr/1234/
22. Ottoman Kurds - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Kurds
23. Ottoman Kurdistan - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Kurdistan
24. dergipark.org.tr, accessed June 5, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/184120
25. Kürt Kültüründe Ahlaki Politik Direniş Ve Zerdüşt'ün Sesi Üzerine ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://demokratikmodernite.org/kurt-kulturunde-ahlaki-politik-direnis-ve-zerdustun-sesi-uzerine/
26. Pontic Greek genocide - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pontic_Greek_genocide
27. Rum Kırımı - Vikipedi, accessed June 5, 2025, https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum_K%C4%B1r%C4%B1m%C4%B1
28. Γενοκτονία των Ελλήνων του Πόντου - Βικιπαίδεια, accessed June 5, 2025, https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%93%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BA%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%AF%CE%B1_%CF%84%CF%89%CE%BD_%CE%95%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AE%CE%BD%CF%89%CE%BD_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_

%CE%A0%CF%8C%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85
29. Ottoman Pogroms - Apologies for Historical Wrongs, accessed June 5, 2025, https://ahrc.surrey.ac.uk/case-studies/ottoman/
30. dergipark.org.tr, accessed June 5, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/113437
31. Armenians and Kurds: A Complex and Strategic Relationship - EVN Report, accessed June 5, 2025, https://evnreport.com/politics/armenians-and-kurds-a-complex-and-strategic-relationship/
32. Lausanne, a Treaty that Abolished the Establishment of Kurdish State, accessed June 5, 2025, https://kurdshop.net/en/history/2123
33. Human rights of Kurdish people in Turkey - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_of_Kurdish_people_in_Turkey
34. A Peace of Their Mind? – The Lausanne Project, accessed June 5, 2025, https://thelausanneproject.com/2024/03/22/a-peace-of-their-mind/
35. dergipark.org.tr, accessed June 5, 2025, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/4580259
36. LOZAN ANTLAŞMASI VE KÜRTLER - dilop, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.kovaradilop.net/2023/12/01/lozan-antlasmasi-ve-kurtler/
37. Kurds in Greece - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurds_in_Greece
38. Kurd, Kurmanji in Greece people group profile - Joshua Project, accessed June 5, 2025, https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/12877/GR
39. Κούρδοι στην Ελλάδα - Βικιπαίδεια, accessed June 5, 2025, https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%B9_%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD_%CE%95%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1
40. Ελληνες αναρχικοί πολεμούν τζιχαντιστές στο δυτικό Κουρδιστάν [εικόνες & βίντεο] - iefimerida.gr, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/339878/ellines-anarhikoi-polemoyn-tzihantistes-sto-dytiko-koyrdistan-eikones-vinteo
41. Greece–Kurdistan Region relations - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece%E2%80%93Kurdistan_Region_relations
42. Why is Greece playing host to PKK terrorists?, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-greece-playing-host-to-pkk-terrorists-60714
43. PKK flags and Ocalan's face: Inside Greece's self-ruling Kurdish enclave | Middle East Eye, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pkk-flags-and-ocalans-face-inside-greeces-self-ruling-kurdish-enclave
44. Consulate General of the Hellenic Republic | Kurdistan Regional ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://gov.krd/dfr-en/foreign-representation/consulate-general-of-the-hellenic-republic/
45. Ιρακινό Κουρδικό δημοψήφισμα ανεξαρτησίας 2017 - Βικιπαίδεια, accessed

June 5, 2025, https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%99%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BA%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C_%CE%9A%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CF%8C_%CE%B4%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%88%CE%AE%CF%86%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B1_%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%BE%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%83%CE%AF%CE%B1%CF%82_2017
46. Atina'da Kürt sorunu konferansı - ANHA, accessed June 5, 2025, https://hawarnews.com/tr/atinada-kurt-sorunu-konferansi
47. What do the Greek people think of the Kurds, do they support the ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.quora.com/What-do-the-Greek-people-think-of-the-Kurds-do-they-support-the-departure-of-the-Kurds-from-Turkey-and-the-creation-of-a-state-in-eastern-Turkey
48. Kurdistan Workers' Party - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party
49. «Σημίτης και Πάγκαλος πρόδωσαν τη φιλία Ελλήνων και Κούρδων», accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.dimokratia.gr/ellada/216981/simitis-kai-pagkalos-prodosan-ti-filia-ellinon-kai/
50. Yunan yetkili: İlticası kabul edilen Kürtlerin... | Rudaw.net, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.rudaw.net/turkish/interview/23102021
51. So, what exactly is the root of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict? : r/kurdistan - Reddit, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/kurdistan/comments/15dwg8o/so_what_exactly_is_the_root_of_the_kurdishturkish/
52. Greece external relations briefing: Greece and the New Middle East ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://china-cee.eu/2025/02/10/greece-external-relations-briefing-greece-and-the-new-middle-east/
53. Foreign relations of Greece - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Greece
54. Cyprus problem - Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_problem
55. Cyprus / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs - mfa,gov, tr, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-cyprus-issue.en.mfa
56. Κυπριακό (ζήτημα) - Βικιπαίδεια, accessed June 5, 2025, https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%9A%CF%85%CF%80%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%B1%CE%BA%CF%8C_(%CE%B6%CE%AE%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%B1)
57. Cyprus Delegation Reaffirms Commitment to Strengthening Ties with Kurdistan Region, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/836655/cyprus-delegation-reaffirms-commitment-to-strengthening-ties-with-kurdistan-region
58. The Turkification of Kurdistan: the world looks on - the Loop: ECPR, accessed June 5, 2025, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-turkification-of-kurdistan-the-world-looks-on/

59. 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights ... - State Department, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cyprus/
60. Kuzey Kıbrıs 16 Kürt Öğrenciyi Sınır Dışı Etti - Bianet, accessed June 5, 2025, https://bianet.org/haber/kuzey-kibris-16-kurt-ogrenciyi-sinir-disi-etti-133646
61. Geopolitical Shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean - Archive of ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://aei.pitt.edu/42920/1/SPB43.pdf
62. Secretary Rubio's Call with Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Barzani - State Department, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-kurdistan-region-president-barzani/
63. Syria's Kurds to insist on decentralised government in talks: official - Kurdistan24, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/842571
64. Kurds threaten to leave Baghdad gov't over salary, oil disputes - The New Arab, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/kurds-threaten-leave-baghdad-govt-over-salary-oil-disputes
65. Kurdish People, History and Politics - Peter Lang, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.peterlang.com/series/kphp
66. Modern Perspectives on Ancient Greece - Fiveable, accessed June 5, 2025, https://fiveable.me/ancient-greece/unit-14/modern-perspectives-ancient-greece/study-guide/xtADsuLW1MglhHUG
67. Ancient Greek Democracy - Athenian, Definition, Modern | HISTORY, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.history.com/articles/ancient-greece-democracy
68. Το κουρδικό εθνικοαπελευθερωτικό κίνημα στη Συρία - slpress.gr, accessed June 5, 2025, https://slpress.gr/diethni/to-kourdiko-ethnikoapeleftherotiko-kinima-sti-siria/
69. Εκστρατεία αρχαιολόγων στα Γαυγάμηλα - Αρχαιολογία Online, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.archaiologia.gr/blog/2011/07/11/%CE%B5%CE%BA%CF%83%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1-%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%87%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%BB%CF%8C%CE%B3%CF%89%CE%BD-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1-%CE%B3%CE%B1%CF%85%CE%B3%CE%AC%CE%BC%CE%B7%CE%BB/
70. Can the 1921 Constitution offer a basis for peace? - Medya News, accessed June 5, 2025, https://medyanews.net/can-the-1921-constitution-offer-a-basis-for-peace/
71. PKK - Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk.en.mfa
72. President Ersin Tatar: “I invite the Greek Cypriot Administration to review its relationship with terrorism and terrorist organisations and to cease cooperating with terrorist organisations, accessed June 5, 2025, https://www.kktcb.org/en/president-ersin-tatar-i-invite-the-greek-cypriot-administration-to-9865

73. Is Erdogan using Kurdish peace talks to secure his political future ..., accessed June 5, 2025, https://360info.org/is-erdogan-using-kurdish-peace-talks-to-secure-his-political-future/
74. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: «We condemn the atrocities inflicted on innocent civilians, including Christians and Alawites in Syria» - Hellasjournal.com, accessed June 5, 2025, https://hellasjournal.com/2025/03/greek-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-we-condemn-the-atrocities-inflicted-on-innocent-civilians-including-christians-and-alawites-in-syria/